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‘Critique’ as Technology of the Self 
 




ABSTRACT: This inquiry is situated at the intersection of two enigmas. The first is the enigma 
of the status of Kant's practice of critique, which has been the subject of heated debate since 
shortly after the publication of the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. The second 
enigma is that of Foucault's apparent later 'turn' to Kant, and the label of 'critique', to describe 
his own theoretical practice. I argue that Kant's practice of 'critique' should be read, after 
Foucault, as a distinctly modern practice in the care of the self, governed by Kant's famous 
rubric of the 'primacy of practical reason'. In this way, too, Foucault's later interest in Kant - 
one which in fact takes up a line present in his work from his complementary thesis on Kant's 
Anthropology - is cast into distinct relief. Against Habermas and others, I propose that this 
interest does not represent any 'break' or 'turn' in Foucault's work. In line with Foucault's 
repeated denials that he was interested after 1976 in a 'return to the ancients', I argue that 
Foucault's writings on critique represent instead both a deepening theoretical self-
consciousness, and part of his project to forge an ethics adequate to the historical present. 
 
 
Critique is virtue 
Michel Foucault, "What is Critique?" 
 
 
Last year (2004) marked the 200th year of the death of Immanuel Kant. In that 
time, Kant's proper name has become nearly synonymous with the word 
'critique' that, without precedent, he introduced as a systematic term into 
Western philosophy. Nevertheless, like the proverbial coin that has been too 
long in circulation, the precise meaning of 'critique' has since smoothed 
around the semantic edges. One hears today of 'critiques' of everything from 
other philosophers to social practices, institutions, epochs and Western 
civilisation itself. "By its function, critique seems to be condemned to 
dispersion, dependency, and pure heteronomy".1 
                                                 
1  Michel Foucault, “What is Virtue”, quoted in Judith Butler, “What is Critique?, an 
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 Ironically, this semantic 'heteronomy' is in one way one more mark of 
Kant's manifold influence upon contemporary thought, an influence that is 
the widest topic of this paper. For, in a familiar intellectual vicissitude, from 
shortly after the 1781 publication of The Critique of Pure Reason, it was only 
Kant's harshest critics who seemed certain about what his work had done. In 
Fichte's words, Kant "philosophised too little about his own philosophising"; 
or again, "this singular thinker looks more marvellous to me every day. I 
believe he possesses a genius that reveals the truth to him without showing 
him why it is true".2 If Kant's critiques undoubtedly aim to hold up a kind of 
philosophical mirror to us, what is clear is that later philosophers have not 
failed to see their own philosophical visages in its "transcendental reflection". 
We are now familiar with Kant the philosopher of science, Kant the proto-
analytic philosopher, Kant the founding- if founded- ontologist of finitude, 
Kant the psychologistic philosopher of mind, or- most recently of all, and the 
joker in the pack- Kant the Lacanian avant la lettre. 
 This essay addresses the question of "what is critique?". I want to 
address this question by engaging with another enigma in the history of 
modern European ideas. This is the enigma posed to us by Michel Foucault's 
later texts on Kant's work, culminating in the 1984 essay: "What is 
Enlightenment?" Foucault's essay marks both the 200th anniversary of Kant's 
essay on the same question, and one of Foucault's own last written texts. The 
enigma here is that Kant stands as an avowed philosophical champion of the 
modernity whose epistemic, disciplinary and biopolitical parameters Foucault 
had devoted much of his career to 'revaluing', in avowedly Nietzschean 
terms. Yet, in Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?": 
 
... we do not meet the Kant familiar from The Order of Things, the 
epistemologist who thrust open the door to the age of anthropological 
thought and the human sciences ... instead we encounter a different Kant- the 
precursor of the Young Hegelians, the Kant who was the first to make a 
serious break with the metaphysical heritage, who turned philosophy away 
from the Eternal Verities and concentrated on what philosophers had until 
then considered to be without concept and nonexistent, merely contingent 
and transitory.3  
  
In the face of this apparent disparity, critics have questioned whether 
Foucault's late works on Kant enact a substantive break with all his other 
work. In "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", Habermas’ tribute to 
Foucault, Habermas famously suggests that this break amounts to something 
of a last minute recantation: 
                                                 
2  Quoted in Daniel Breazeale, “On Kant’s Method”. (Unpublished paper, delivered at 
Bicentennial Immanuel Kant Conference, University of Auckland, 2004), 1. 
3  Jürgen Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", The New Conservatives 
edited and translated by Sherry Weber Nicholson (London: Polity Press 1989), 174. 
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"Of the circle of those in my generation engaged in philosophical diagnoses 
of the times, Foucault has had the most lasting effect on the zeitgeist, not least 
because of the earnestness with which he perseveres in productive 
contradictions ... Equally instructive is the contradiction in which Foucault 
becomes entangled when he opposes his critique of power, … with the 
analytic of the true in such a way that the former is deprived of the 
normative standards it would have to derive from the latter. Perhaps it is this 
contradiction that drew Foucault, in this last of his texts, back into a sphere of 
influence he had tried to blast open, that of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity ..."4  
  
 My thesis is this. In order to sustain any strong hypothesis of a 'final 
Foucault', critics have to elide several important things. First, there is the fact 
that "What is Enlightenment?" is not a 'stand alone' piece of Foucault’s on 
Kant. Foucault's later, positive interest in Kant dates back at least as far as 
May 1978, when he gave a lecture entitled "What is Critique?" to the French 
Society of Philosophy.5 This fact alone dates the later Foucaultian interest in 
Kant as very nearly coterminous with his much more widely remarked 
‘return to the ancients’ after Volume I of History of Sexuality. (See Conclusion) 
We should also recall, in this connection, that the young Foucault translated 
Kant’s Anthropology, and that his these complementaire was a commentary on 
Kant’s last published text, and its bearing on the question what is man? that he 
was to take up in The Order of Things. 6  
                                                 
4  Habermas, “Taking Aim …”, 178-179. For an authoritative survey of Habermas’ 
response to Foucault, cf. Dreyfus, Hubert and Rabinow, Paul (1986) `What is 
Maturity? Foucault and Habermas on "What is Enlightenment?" ', in Foucault: A 
Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109-121. 
Cf. also Michael Kelly ed. Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate 
(Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1994). 
5  Judith Butler, “What is Critique”, p. 20, note 4. 
6  We cannot discuss in detail here the vexed question of the role of Kant in the earlier 
Foucault. It suffices for the position here to say that Han and Allen have differently 
but convincingly shown that the position of (for example) Thomas Wartenberg and 
James Schmidt that in The Order of Things, Kant figures only negatively, as that 
figure who “had the dubious honor of awakening philosophy from its ‘dogmatic 
slumbers’ only to lull it back into what Foucault dubbed the ‘anthropological sleep’”, 
is overly simplistic. (James Schmidt and Thomas Wartenberg, “Foucault’s 
Enlightenment: Critique, Revolution, and the Fashioning of the Self”, in Kelly ed. 
Critique and Power, 146) It is not only that, for Foucault, Kant stands as the 
inaugurator of “our modernity”, with its post-classical episteme, within whose scope 
we cannot help but think. (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1994), 242) As Foucault comments in “A Preface 
to Transgression”, a contemporaneous piece to The Order of Things, for him Kant 
“opened the way for the advance of critical thought”, both in his exposure of the 
classical episteme as metaphysical, and in his attempt to think human finitude in the 
transcendental orbit, which resists anthropologisation. As I will argue in the 
conclusion, I thus follow Han and Allen in asserting a continuity in Foucault’s 
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Second, there are Foucault's denials of any break of his later texts with 
his earlier work. In the "Preface" of The Use of Pleasure, Foucault already 
proclaimed that the later work on the ancients "made it possible to go back 
through what I was already thinking, ... and to see what I had done from a 
different perspective ... I seem to have gained a better perspective on the way 
that I worked ..."7 In "What is Enlightenment?", which is more in point, 
Foucault denies that the Kantian work of 'critique' simply opposes what "the 
historical ontology of the present" that he had been constructing since the 
1960s. Rather, as Beatrice Hans in particular has interrogated, he proposes an 
“archaeological” and “genealogical” transformation of it, as we shall 
comment in Conclusion.8 
 With these markers pointing towards a closer proximity of Foucault to 
Kant than might be thought, what I want to propose here is something even 
more apparently unlikely, and as far as I am aware, unprecedented. In his 
essay on Descartes, "My Body, This Paper, This Fire", Foucault centrally 
criticises Derrida for not reading Descartes' Meditations as a textual practice in 
askesis: the ethical process of self-formation. A "meditation", Foucault stresses, 
is a form of what he elsewhere calls "self writing", written techniques through 
which individuals in Stoicism and Christianity monitored and transformed 
his rapport a soi (relationship to her/himself).9 Descartes' famous text in 'first 
philosophy', Foucault agrees in a different register with both Heidegger and 
Derrida10 is not the complete break with the past that it presents itself as. 
Whatever we might be drawn to say about its enunciated content, there is 
another, performative level of the text, as a practice in askesis. On this level of its 
enunciation, a continuity with the tradition is harboured: 
 
"On the other hand, a "meditation" produces, as so many discursive events, 
new utterances that carry with them a series of modifications of the 
enunciating subject [: through what is said in meditation, the subject passes 
from darkness to light, from impurity to purity, from the constraint of 
                                                                                                                                            
appraisal of Kant, one which has a lasting bearing on the construction of his critical 
project. Cf. Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the 
Historical, translated by Edward Pile (Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 17-37, esp. 
19-20; Amy Allen, “Foucault and Enlightenment: A Critical Reappraisal”. 
Constellations, Volume 10. No. 2: 183, 184-186, 187. 
7  Michel Foucault, Use of Pleasure (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 11 
8  Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?”, in The Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 
I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow. (New York: New Press, 1997), p. 
315; cf. Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the 
Historical translated by Edward Pile (Stanford University Press, 1998). 
9  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 207 ff. 
10  Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time trans. Macquarie and Robinson (London: 
Blackwell, 1983), #18-21], 
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passions to detachment, from uncertainty and disordered movements to the 
serenity of wisdom, and so on]".11  
 
 My hypothesis here, put simply, is that we should- and can 
productively- read Kantian 'critique' as Foucault reads Descartes' meditative 
philosophical practice. To do this will be to analyse 'critique', as Foucault only 
suggested, as a modern "technology of the self" that stands in the line of older 
methods of askesis. To say this is not to commit oneself to the untenable idea 
that 'critique' is, or is even directly continuous with, pre-modern forms of 
askesis, "self writing" or philosophy in general. As Robert Pippin writes: 
 
... the issue [Kant] virtually invented, the 'conditions of the possibility of 
possible experience' is ... a radically new formulation of philosophy's task. 
and so provides for the first time the appropriate way of thinking about the 
deepest philosophical issues in the modern revolution.12  
 
If we are to read 'critique' as a 'technology of the self', that is, we shall have to 
recognise that it introduces new elements, instruments deep changes, and- not 
least- lays claim to a universal validity, proffering its work of askesis as 
repeatable by anyone. Nevertheless, the 'gains' of this procedure, if it is 
tenable at all, are evident, as I shall expand in Conclusion. On the side of Kant 
scholarship, we will have made a provocative intervention in the continuing 
debate concerning Kant's method. On the side of Foucault scholarship, we 
shall have provided a significant foundation for understanding why Foucault 
might have turned to Kant at the same time as he apparently returned to the 
Greeks. It is telling here, I would suggest, that Foucault himself says in "What 
is Enlightenment?" that the "modernity" Kant's critiques are tied to is: 
 
... an attitude ... a voluntary choice made by certain people ... a way of 
thinking and of feeling that at one and the same time marks a relation of 
belonging and a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos.13 
 
I: The Primacy of Practical Reason, and the Ideal of the 
Highest Good 
 
We have mentioned the plethora of understandings of Kant's practice in the 
three Critiques. These vary nearly as much as the more well-known opinions 
about the significance of his achievement. The enigma here can be stated 
economically: Kant's Critiques trace our intellectual, aesthetic and moral 
                                                 
11  Michel Foucault, “My body, this paper, this fire" Translated by Geoff Bennington, 
slightly modified, in J. Faubion, ed., Aesthetics, method and epistemology (New York: 
New Press, 1998), 406  
12  Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem 2nd edition (London: Blackwell, 
1999), 46. 
13  Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?”, 309 (my italics). 
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capabilities back to the workings of our cognitive 'faculties' or 'powers'. Yet 
the very performance of this 'tracing back' does not exactly match what Kant 
tells us that any of these faculties can achieve, either alone or in conjunction. 
The statements that comprise the Critiques can clearly not be the products of 
either pre-discursive "intuition"14 or of "imagination" that synthesises the 
'intuitions' and performs the mysterious work of the schematism.15 But neither 
do Kant's texts 'match' the described accomplishments of the "understanding" 
whose possibility they explain. The Critiques are not works in natural 
science.16 Nor however do their conclusions or method map exactly onto the 
described achievements of theoretical "reason", which inferentially and 
asymptotically works to unify the totality of given judgments into a coherent 
whole.17  
What all purely 'theoretical' stagings of Kant's work overlook, 
however, is Kant's repeated avowal of 'the primacy of practical reason' to his 
critical endeavours. And it is this ‘primacy’ that I want to problematise here. 
To be sure, following Kant's own texts, this 'primacy' is most often taken to 
refer to Kant's rethinking of the Ideas of Reason (Freedom, God, Immortality)- 
which were hitherto the province of theoretical metaphysics- in terms of his 
thinking about morality.18 Where speculative reason was, as we could say, 
there now practical reason shall be; or, in the famed words of the B preface to 
The Critique of Pure Reason: "I have found it necessary to deny knowledge in 
order to make room for faith".19 Yet, I think Velkley is clearly right to argue 
that any position that would assert that this Kantian operation exhausts the 
meaning of the 'primacy of practical reason' falls short. In several different 
ways, this 'primacy' is a more involved matter.  
In a 'Reflection' of 1869, Kant wrote:  
 
'The practical sciences determine the worth of the theoretical. What has no 
such [practical] employment is indeed worthless. The practical sciences come 
first in relation to intention, because ends must precede means. But in 
execution, the theoretical sciences must be first'.20  
 
And this passage is far from ‘standing alone’ in Kant’s oeuvre, as Velkley 
highlights. The opposition that it establishes, between a priority in ‘execution’ 
(where theoretical work must come first) as against a priority in significance 
                                                 
14  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 
1929), A19 ff. 
15  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A100-102, B103, A136/B176 ff. 
16  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A148/B187 ff. 
17  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A302/B359 
18  Richard Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 9. 
19  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx. 
20  At Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, 5 
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(where moral or practical concerns must come first, because ends orient 
means), anticipates Kant's 'mature' insistence that his critical theoretical work 
was 'propaedeutic' to work in metaphysics, conceived primarily as a 
metaphysics of morals.21 This is a key position Kant defends in the first 
Critique's "Doctrine of Method" in general, and "The Canon of Pure Reason" 
in particular. "All the interests" of reason coalesce around three Ideas, Kant 
claims in Sections I and II of the “Canon”- God, freedom, and immortality.22 
Yet, according to Kant, in a position that clearly anticipates the "Postulates" in 
the second Critique, our reason-able interest in these Ideas is in its turn 
animated by “practical” concerns, and the orienting question “what we ought 
to do?”23 Reason is “impelled by a tendency of its nature”, Kant contends in 
Section II, towards conceiving what Kant he calls the "ideal of the highest 
good": a natural world in which moral autonomy would yet converge fully 
with the just distribution of happiness24. And it is “only for the sake of this 
convergence [that] reason postulate[s] God and a future life”.25  
 Highlighting such Kantian testimony, Beiser and Velkey have argued 
that the key figure in awakening Kant from his metaphysical slumbers was 
not David Hume but Jean-Jacques Rousseau. According to Velkley, 
Rousseau's significance arises from his well-known ethico-political criticism 
of the enlightenment, which Kant encountered in 1764-65.26 Rousseau's 
criticism introduced to Kant the possibility that the unchecked development 
of reason in its post-Baconian, instrumental forms may produce a culture no 
less inhumane than the nature which it allows humans to master. In Beiser's 
account, Rousseau's defence of human autonomy in The Social Contract 
occasioned not only Kant's break with 'moral sentiment' theories, and 
'relocation' of the moral substance in a reason above and beyond ‘natural’ 
affects.27 It also instituted a "primacy of the political" in Kant's thinking. 
Rousseau taught Kant that "metaphysics undermined rather than supported 
morality", "alienating" humans from a recognition of their own moral 
autonomy by "hypostasising" its products- the laws of human morality- as the 
expression of the will or 'natural law' of God.28  
In both Beiser’s and Velkley’s accounts, then, Kant’s critical 
philosophy- conceived as decisively post-Rousseauian29- is situated as a 
                                                 
21  Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, 5 
22  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A805/B833. 
23  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A800/B828. 
24  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A808/B836. 
25  Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, 141. 
26  Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, chapter 1. 
27  Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 30. 
28  Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 32. 
29  Compare also Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, 48-49. 
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response to its particular ethico-political context, or what Leo Strauss calls 
“the first crisis of modernity”.30 The reservation of space for ‘private’ belief, as 
a kind of beneficial side effect of the critique of cognition, is thus far from 
being all that is in play in Kant’s claim that critique is primarily practical.  
And pertinently for us here, it is such an ethico-political understanding 
of critique that Foucault also defends in his later works on Kant. In an 
astonishing paragraph connecting Kant's short "Answer to the Question: 
'What is Enlightenment?'" to his larger critical philosophy, Foucault writes in 
his “What is Enlightenment?” paper exactly: 
 
Kant, in fact, describes enlightenment as the moment when humanity is 
going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; 
now, it is precisely at this moment that critique is necessary: since its role is 
that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in 
order to determine what can be known [connaitre], what must be done, and 
what may be hoped ... The critique is, in a sense, the handbook of reason in 
the age of enlightenment and, conversely, the Enlightenment is the age of 
critique.31  
  
It is at this point that I want to introduce my exegetical hypothesis directly, of 
reading 'critique' as a 'technology of the self'.  
 
II: Technologies of the Self, and Foucault's Stoicism 
 
Foucault does not use the term 'technology of the self" in Volume II of History 
of Sexuality. It is developed in the context of Foucault's work on the Hellenic 
and Imperial periods, and in particular in his work on the Stoics.32 Kant's debt 
to ancient scepticism, mediated via eighteenth century German thought and 
David Hume, is well established.33 Yet Kant also repeatedly avowed his 
admiration of the Stoics. To quote The Logic: 
 
The Stoics … were dialectical in speculative philosophy, dogmatic in moral 
philosophy, and showed an unusual dignity in their practical principles, by 
which they sowed the seeds of the most sublime ethos that ever existed …34 
 
                                                 
30  Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity”, in Introduction to Political Philosophy 
edited by Hilail Giblin (Wayne State University Press: USA, 1990). 
31  Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 308. 
32  Michel Foucault, Care of the Self . The History of Sexuality Volume III translated Robert 
Hurley (London: Penguin, `986), 45 ; Michel Foucault, Ethics, 208 ff, 223-250. 
33  Cf. Giorgio Tonelli, “Kant and the Ancient Skeptics”, pp. 69-98 in Richard H. Popkin 
et al (eds.) Scepticism in the Enlightenment (Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 
1997), 69-98. 
34  Immanuel Kant, Logic translated with an Introduction by Robert S. Hartman and 
Wolfgang Schwarz (Dover: New York, 1974), 34; Cf. Richard Velkley, Freedom and the 
End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 105 ff. 
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 Foucault's appraisal of the Stoics is concerned, in the programmatic 
terms of his later 'genealogy of ethics', to trace the continuities and 
discontinuities of Stoic ethics with the Greeks’. In contrast both with 'Platonic' 
philosophy but also the Christian 'hermeneutics of the self'35, Foucault in 
particular underscores how, in Stoicism, the truth that the self must orient its 
askesis around hails from outside himself, in the logoi of the teachers and the 
masters.36 The particular Stoic technes that he examines- the written 
hupomnemata that the subject produces and keeps close37, the bodily gumnasia 
38 or such meditative practices (melete) as the famous praemeditatio malorum 39- 
are all then conceived by Stoicism as "ethico-poetic" [Plutarch] ways in which 
this external truth is made personal or "subjectivised".40 Mutatis mutandis, the 
ergon of the ascetic techniques of the Stoics was not the confessional 
unearthing or "reactivation" of guilt about abhorrent ‘internal’ desires. It was 
instead a question of periodically and deliberately (re)activating in the 
individual's mind the "rules of action"41 he would internalise: of "a set of 
practices by which one can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into a 
permanent principle of action".42 
 Two things from Foucault's reading of the Stoics need to be singled out 
here. First, at the level of what Foucault calls the ethical "substance": the Stoic 
practices, for Foucault, are not concerned primarily with the individual's 
ideas and impulses, whether to interpret their concealed origins or otherwise. 
As Foucault specifies in reading Epictetus' conception of "self-examination", 
"he means [that] as soon as an idea comes to mind"- to emphasise, from whence 
ever this idea might have come- "you have to think of the rules you must apply to 
evaluate it".43 It is a question, that is, not of one's ideas or impulses themselves 
but of how one responds to them, in the light of the true logoi that one is striving 
to subjectivise. As Foucault writes: "the subject is not the operating ground for 
the process of deciphering but the point where the rules of conduct come 
together in memory".44 Secondly, the telos of Stoic ethics, as in Greek ethics, 
remains self-mastery: "the progressive consideration of self ... attained not 
through the renunciation of reality [as in Christian ethics] but through the 
acquisition and assimilation of truth".45 Stoic ascetic practices serve this end 
by standing as a kind of periodic testing of one's self: "it is a question of 
                                                 
35  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 83-86, 241-249 
36  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 237, 238. 
37  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 209-214. 
38  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 240. 
39  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 239. 
40  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 209. 
41  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 238. 
42  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 239. 
43  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 240. 
44  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 237. 
45  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 239. 
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testing the [self's ethical] preparation. Is this truth assimilated enough to 
become ethics so that we can behave as we must when an event presents 
itself?"46 
 
III: Critique as Technology of the Self 
 
In the "Preface" to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault introduces a quadripartite 
schema in order to analyse different ethical modes of rapport a soi, which 
interestingly evokes the four causes of the Greeks. Each historical form of 
ethical self-relationship is analysed as to its "substance" ("the material that is 
going to be worked over by ethics"47); a mode of subjectivation ("the way in 
which people are invited or incited to recognise their moral obligations"48); the 
means by which the ethical self-transformation is undertaken49, and the telos 
that orients the entire rapport.50  
 Applying this schema to Kantian critique, what can we say? At the 
level of the telos or ‘final cause’, we have already seen that Kant names the 
telos of his critical philosophy "the ideal of the highest good": a world where 
nature has been harmonised with autonomy. The "substance" which "critique" 
would "work over" as a "propadaeutic" to this end is evidently the most 
distant “aspect” of critique from any of the ethical practices Foucault 
examines.51 As Kant makes clear from the 1781 "Preface" to The Critique of Pure 
Reason, 'critique' is a practice in philosophy conceived as metaphysics. The 
"substance" it will problematise is a reason that would be impersonal, 
universal and a priori, whether theoretical or practical. What remains to be 
investigated, then, is the not-inconsiderable problem of how the means of 
critique, together with its mode of subjectivation, are to work upon this 
impersonal and apparently theoretical reason, in order to move towards this 




The decisive point that Foucault singles out in the quote from "What is 
Enlightenment?" above, alongside Velkley and Beiser, is that Kant's "critique" 
of reason does not issue in a wholesale rejection of reason's authority.52 Such a 
rejection would presuppose access to some foundational Truth higher or 
deeper than reason, in whose name the rejection could be enacted. Yet, as 
                                                 
46  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 241. 
47  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 263 
48  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 264, 
49  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 265. 
50  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 265. 
51  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 263. 
52  Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, 3 ff. 
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O'Neill argues, Kant's "Doctrine of Method" in The Critique of Pure Reason 
emphasises that "critique" simply does not aim to resolve the aporias that the 
"Transcendental Dialectic" shows insist whenever rational systems have tried 
to render themselves wholly systematic.53 Kant's issue with both scepticism 
and dogmatism is of a different kind. Each, according to Kant, presupposes 
that the ideal of philosophy ought to be an account that could speak 
knowingly and/or wholly about Things-in-themselves. The one side 
(dogmatism) claims successes in achieving this ideal, while the other, in 
accepting defeat, denounces (and potentially renounces) reason itself. For 
Kantian critique, however, what is at issue is rather the inherited presupposition 
of this very ideal- whether affirmed or denied.54 To quote Robert Pippin:  
 
Kant’s idealism … replaces the great classical and early modern theme of 
‘nature’ (the discovery of which originally made philosophy possible) with a 
new issue …55  
 
 In other words, the practice (or, in Foucault's terms, the "means") of 
"critique' is simply not situated at the same level as previous philosophical accounts. 
There is then a formal parallel to be drawn here, as can be seen, between how 
all previous 'metaphysical' claims to the Truth stand for Kantian 'critique', and 
how the "ideas" and impulses of the individual stand in Stoic technologies of 
the self: to recall, not as contents to be affirmed, denied, or interpreted, but to 
be tested "administratively" against the logoi that the Stoic subject has made 
his own.56 One could not be more wrong for this reason to assert, as Zygmunt 
Bauman has done, that Kant's 'critical philosophy' is totalising, and hence 
implicitly (at least ) totalitarian.57 "Reason is no dictator", Kant argues.58 To 
paraphrase Foucault on the Stoics, Kant's Critiques are not the operating 
ground for the location of any One Truth of the Whole, to which all would 
have to accede. They are rather the point where the rules of reason are 
brought together, and reason itself is held up not as a claimant to 
metaphysical Truth concerning Things-in-Themselves, but as a tribunal 
wherein all such claims can be evaluated, and to which they can be duly referred. 
This, I would contend, is the reason why, as has been pointed out59, one of the 
                                                 
53  Onora O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason.” The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. P. Guyer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 282 ff. 
54  Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 30 ff.; cf. Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy edited with an interpretive essay by Ronald Beiner (USA: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 32-33, 34. 
55  Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 46. 
56  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 208 ff.; 238 ff. 
57  Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1991) 
58  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A786/B814; Cf. O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason”, 296. 
59  Stanley Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics (Oxford University Press: UK, 1987), 35-36. 
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predominant metaphorics Kant draws on to describe his own philosophical 
practice is juridical: in fact "patterned on a specific legal tradition within the 
late Roman Empire" (sic.), as Daniel Breazeale and Dieter Henrich have 
noted.60 In “The Doctrine of Method”, Kant describes the ‘negative’ aspect of 
critical philosophy- in terms that are very evocative, given Foucault’s later 
work- as a “discipline”.61  
All of this might however seem to situate Kantian critique as- 
precisely- the most sublime exercise imaginable in begging the question. We 
might well accept that "critique", like Stoic self-examination, is a kind of 
'second-order' philosophical activity that would evaluate 'first order' 
metaphysical claims. Yet none of this resolves the prior question of from 
whence the critical subject could itself derive and justify the 'juridical' 
principles with which this edifying activity would be accomplished.62  
To this question Kant's answer is simple and decisive. To quote the A 
"Preface" of The Critique of Pure Reason, "critique" responds to a call he claims 
to hear resounding in the "age" itself: a "call to reason to undertake the most 
laborious of all tasks- that of self-examination".63 In Foucault's terms in "The 
Ethics of Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom", that is to say, 
"critique"- certainly no less than Greek ethics although in a different register- 
is a considered practice of self-reflection.64  
In order to understand how this is possible (sic.), let us consider Kant's 
"transcendental deduction" of the categories. Kant proclaimed this to be both 
his hardest and most important labour on behalf of metaphysics.65 Two things 
are decisive about this ‘labour’ for us here: 
 
*  First, Kant's argument does not proceed by showing simply and directly 
that, since there is an evident disparity between the manifold diversity of 
our intuitions and the ordered unity of our intelligible experiences, some 
work of active cognitive synthesis must be presupposed. Such an 
argument, by itself, would not have stood for anything against Hume, 
and/or would not have demonstrated the imputed a priori necessity of the 
categories. Kant's argument rather proceeds by way of nothing short of a 
transcendental demonstration that all consciousness is implicitly self-
consciousness. It is only a philosophical recollection of what Kant calls "the 
unity of apperception", in virtue of which “it must be possible for the "'I 
think' to accompany all my representations"66, that Kant thinks allows us 
                                                 
60  Breazeale, “On Kant’s Method”, p. 3. 
61  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A708-712/B736-740. 
62  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A710/B738. 
63  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Ax (my italics). 
64  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 284. 
65  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axvi. 
66  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B131. 
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to 'deduce' the necessity of the categories. And why is this? Kant’s claim is 
that if, per impossible, consciousness did not have access to such formative 
a priori concepts, neither could it ever stand at a sufficient distance from 
this manifold as to be able to conceive of its diversity as one unity which ‘I 
think’.67 
* Second, the terms in which Kant differentiates "transcendental deduction" 
from other types of inquiry, which draw on the Roman juridical tropes 
noted above, are crucial. Transcendental deduction does not ask a 
question of fact (quid facti) about what it aims to explain, Kant specifies. It 
asks a question of a legalistic nature, "about that which is rightful (quid 
juris)".68 What is decisive here is that the question quid juris will then not 
be satisfied by recourse to some event, property, cause, or sufficient 
reason for what is to be explained. Rather, it demands that its respondent- 
to take up Kant's juridical language- him/herself 'take a stand' by adducing 
(a) principle(s) in whose name s/he has acted. What a transcendental 
deduction asks about, that is- and also what it anticipates- are that 
normative rules will be found, even in the heart of the most 'pre-reflective' 
human experiences. It is a question of rules and proprieties, if you like, 
not things and their properties. As Robert Brandom in particular has 
highlighted, for Kant (as later for Frege or Wittgenstein), to be a subject is 
to be a rule-following being.69 To quote Robert Pippin: 
 
"Kant attempts to show that in all empirical experience, or representation of 
objects, and in all intentional activity, there simply are, necessarily, 
spontaneously, self-legislated rules or conditions, that human awareness and 
action is spontaneously self-determining, whether we recognise it as such or 
not".70 
 
Mode of Subjectivation: 
 
The meaningfulness of reading "critique" as a "technology of the self" begins 
to emerge. The "means" of Kantian critique is a self-reflection of the subject of 
reason, or what Kant calls in "The Amphibology of Pure Reason", 
"transcendental reflection".71 This practice would make explicit the rules that 
this subject has implicitly been bound to all along, and in virtue of which it is 
constituted as the subject that it is. What remains, from the perspective of the 
later Foucault's schema, is only the question of the mode d'assujettissement, 
through which the subject of reason would be hailed as a subject of critique. 
                                                 
67  P.F Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: 
Methuen, 1966), 96-97. 
68  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A84/B114 
69  Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Harvard University Press: USA, 2000), 158-164. 
70  Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 49. 
71  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260/B310 ff.; Cf. Breazeale, “On Kant’s Method”, p. 13. 
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Answering this question, I contend, will also allow us to resolve the still-
opaque connection between the means of critical self-reflection, and the 
ethico-political end of human autonomy.  
For if we ask about the way in which the subject of reason is “invited” 
by critique to undertake its self-reflective work, we must answer that for 
Kant, the answer is not simply that it is "because we are rational beings".72 The 
thing that calls forth the 'critical' or negative aspect of critique, according to 
him (and we recall here our remarks above about Rousseau), is rather that, as 
rational beings, we are always (potentially) divided against ourselves, and 
liable to actively fall into one or other form of heteronomy.73 As Kant 
commences the “Canon of Pure Reason” by saying: 
 
It is humiliating to human reason that it achieves nothing in its pure 
employment, and indeed stands in need of a discipline to check its 
extravagances, and to guard it against the deceptions which arise therefrom.74 
 
Gilles Deleuze has observed, in Difference and Repetition that, with the notion 
of "transcendental illusion", Kant introduces into the history of ideas a 
profoundly new notion of what philosophy should rightfully oppose.75 For, in 
what amounts to a truly striking anthropological hypothesis, Kant effectively 
suggests in the "Transcendental Dialectic" that the origins of humanity's 
inveterate interests in God, Freedom, and the Truth of the Whole (‘Nature’) lie 
in nothing more august than the rational practices (like counting or dividing) 
of our most everyday thinking.76 The problem is that, if these 'all-too-human' 
modes of reasoning are simply iterated, they eventually generate the 
"transcendental illusion[s]" of some Noumenal entity or event that would 
close the series, but whose (non)existence can in no way be verified. The 
reason is that- if we can conceive or believe in the existence of such Things as 
God or a first cause- we can only conceive them as beyond the scope of the 
possible operation of the categories that lay out the framework of what we 
can legitimately discursively assert.77 Intuitions without concepts are blind, as 
Kant says, but also concepts without intuitions must remain empty.78  
And it is here – with this recognition of the mode of subjectivation of 
critique as the “call” to us as divided rational beings – that the connection of 
                                                 
72  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 264. Foucault is here speaking of the Stoics. 
73  Cf. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 32. “Using his own mind, Kant 
discovered the ‘scandal of reason’, that is, that it is not just tradition and authority 
that lead us astray but the faculty of reason itself”. 
74  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A795/B823; cf. A850/B878. 
75  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition translated by Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 150. 
76  Cf. O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason”, p. 291. 
77  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A756/B784. 
78  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. 
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critique’s peculiar means of rational askesis with Kant's interest in autonomy 
emerges. In "What is Critique?", Foucault comments that critique as such is 
always concerned with "how not to be governed, or, better, the art of not 
being governed like that at that cost".79 Foucault’s comment in "What is 
Enlightenment?" is however more precise, when he says that, for Kant:  
 
... illegitimate uses of reason are what give rise to dogmatism and 
heteronomy, along with illusions; on the other hand, it is when the legitimate 
use of reason has been clearly defined that its autonomy can be assured.80 
 
And why is this? "Uses of reason" are illegitimate, according to Kant, when 
they lead subjects to make claims to truth or rightness that yet cannot be 
justified except in terms of ‘ghost seer’-like access to foundations beyond the 
legitimate scope of the rules that critique has shown necessarily underlie 
intelligible experience.  
 
In Kant’s general view … to be ‘premodern’ or in any sense less enlightened 
than one should be, is to be ‘uncritical’. In the obvious sense of that term, this 
just means claiming to know something, or to make a claim on someone, 
without being able to justify such a claim against objectors.81 
 
 A further parallel between critique as ethical and classical ethics announces 
itself here, then. In classical ethics, the tyrant was conceived of as someone 
who "exceeds the legitimate exercise of one's power" insofar as s/he had not 
mastered her own "fantasies, appetites and illusions", as Foucault puts it.82 But 
just so, for Kant, a potential tyrant is s/he who has not tested her/his ideas by 
critique, and so can think to impose their unmastered claims about the Whole 
monologically upon others.  
Kantian autonomy, on the other hand, is not some untutored negative 
liberty from all norms or constraints, as conservative critics will probably 
always repeat. It is thinking and acting on principles (nomoi) that “defer to no 
'ungrounded' authority"- whether philosophical or political83- but rather hail 
from what Kant calls variously the "spontaneity" or "epigenesis" of one's own 
(auto) reason. To quote "What is Orientation in Thinking?": 
 
To think for oneself is a matter of seeking the highest touchstone of truth in 
oneself (that is, in one's own reason), and the maxim of thinking for oneself at 
all times constitutes enlightenment...84  
 
                                                 
79  At Butler, “What is Critique? Foucault’s Virtue”, p. 9; Stefan Bohm and Sverre 
Spoelstra, “No Critique” Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization (2004), p. 96 
80  Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, p. 308. 
81  Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 55. 
82  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 288. 
83  O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason”, p. 299. 
84  At O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason”, p. 300. 
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In other words, although Kant's presentations very often suggest that the telos 
of critique lies even asymptotically only at the end of the process of self-
reflection, it is as true- and arguably more historically singular- that this telos 
of autonomy in another sense also coincides with the means of critique itself. 
Herbert Marcuse put this idea much later when he argued in “Philosophy and 
Critical Theory” that, after Kant, "freedom is the ‘formal element’ of 




So, to schematise, the claim is that Kant’s critique is a technology of the self 
whose parameters can be analysed fruitfully in terms of Foucault’s four-fold 
schema for the analysis of such techniques. The schema looks like this: 
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There are at least two reasons to oppose such a reading. The first is what Ian 
Hunter, drawing on Foucault, calls the "abstract and academic character of 
modern philosophy [which] means that it is no longer cultivated as a way of 
life".86 This manifest abstractness of Kantian critique is registered in the 
schema in the would-be substance of critique conceived as askesis, which is 
reason in its a priori potentialities. The second and deeper hesitation concerns 
a correlative of this ‘abstract and academic character’: namely, that critique is 
directed at the subject of reason, who could be anyone at all. As Foucault 
specifies in “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, Descartes’ Meditations, themselves 
an askesis, nevertheless set in place a methodological procedure that could be 
followed by anyone. This meant that for the first time, “evidence is 
substituted for askesis at the point where the relationship to the self intersects 
with the relation to others and to the world”.87 Kant’s subject of reason, 
however divided, would seem, no less than the nameless subject of Descartes’ 
                                                 
85  Herbert Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory”, in Negations (Penguin: London, 
translated by Jeffrey Shapiro, 1968: 137 
86  Ian Hunter, “The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant’s Groundwork As Intellectual 
Paideia.” Critical Inquiry (Chicago) 28 (2002), 908; Cf. Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth, 279-280.  
87  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 279. 
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Meditations, to be no one in particular and so hardly a likely basis for any 
technology of ‘self’-formation. 
 The ‘gains’ of this manoeuvre can however now be spelt out. On the 
level of Kant scholarship, to read Kantian critique as an- albeit impersonal- 
ascetic practice, is to reinstall the ‘primacy of practical reason’ at the heart of 
our understanding of Kant. In doing so, we would be placing the ongoing 
debate about Kant’s method on a quite different, and less ‘abstract and 
academic’ footing. If critique is seen, as Foucault defines ethics as such, as a 
“considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection”88, all 
depictions of Kant as a proto-analytic philosopher, or unwitting ‘synthetic’ 
empiricist, are by-passed. This is not the type of account that is required, any 
more than a new statement in traditional metaphysics was the type of account 
that Kant was after. Rather, Kant’s chimerical naming of the concern of 
philosophy as the ‘synthetic a priori’ could be read as registering Kant’s new 
conception of philosophy as a practice in self-reflection, at a different level 
than speculative attempts to systematically account for the Truth of the 
whole. We would here be joining recent work by Daniel Breazeale on Kant, 
which locates the ground of his procedure in the capacity for “transcendental 
reflection”. As Breazeale says: ”An apt motto for transcendental philosophy 
might therefore be the Delphic dictum: ‘Know Thyself’”89.  
 The work such a reading of critique does is even clearer in terms of our 
understanding of why Foucault might have been drawn to describe himself 
shortly before his death as a thinker “if … indeed perfectly at home in the 
philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of Kant”.90 Critics who 
would suggest that the later Foucault enacted a nostalgic return to the Greeks 
need always to recall his citation of Baudelaire’s principle ‘You have no right 
to despise the present” in “What is Enlightenment?”, let alone his own denials 
of any such move.91 Surely the deepest problem with this reading of 
Foucault’s later work, however, is that, in order to valorise the Greeks even so 
much as he does, Foucault needs to bracket or de-emphasise any references to 
the cosmological framing of Greek ethics- witness for example Book I of the 
Nichomachean Ethics. As Charles Taylor nicely puts it, “the underlying ideal” 
(or telos) of Foucault’s later reflections, in terms of the history of ideas, seems 
to be patently un-Greek; indeed “some variant of that most invisible, because 
it is the most pervasive, modern goods, unconstrained freedom”.92  
 What reading critique according to the methodology that Foucault 
used to read the Greeks and Romans shows, though, is how close critique 
stands to the type of self-forming activity that Foucault is clearly attracted to 
                                                 
88  Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 284. 
89  Breazeale, “On Kant’s Method”, 13; Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, 55. 
90  At Bohm and Spoestra, “No Critique”, p. 95. 
91  Cf. David Owen, Maturity and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 206 
92  Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 489. 
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in the self-mastery of the Greeks- one which is carried out, that is, out of the 
reach of norms imposed asymmetrically by authorities external to the subject. 
To quote the first Critique: 
 
Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism, should it limit 
freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it should harm itself … nothing is 
so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be 
exempted from this searching examination, which knows no respect for 
persons. Reason depends on freedom for its very existence.93  
 
Moreover, if we read critique as a procedure in “self-discipline”94 
whose only ‘product’ is not a doctrine, but a subject who reserves the 
autonomy to ask the quid juris question about any and all claims that it makes 
or that are made upon it, we can see how such a methodological program can 
have been ‘owned’ by Foucault late in his career. Amy Allen in particular has 
emphasised this in her “Foucault and Enlightenment: A Critical 
Reappraisal”.95 Foucault in no way renounces his critique (sic.) of the 
disciplinary and biopolitical aspects of modernity in his texts on Kant. This is 
the force of his scathing remarks about humanism, and the “blackmail of the 
enlightenment”, in “What is Enlightenment?”96 In this context, it is not just 
that Foucault now says that he is “inclined to see enlightenment and 
humanism in tension rather than identity”.97 This new insight is grounded in 
his owning of critique as an ethos or “work carried out by ourselves upon 
ourselves as free beings”; and of enlightenment, as in Kant, as an ongoing task 
rather than some already-achieved accomplishment whose completed forms 
we could passively admire.98 Such a self-reflective ethos, in particular, is 
always able to see in modern humanism simply one more type of- albeit 
institutionalised and historical- metaphysical position (like dogmatism or 
scepticism in the first Critique) that would lay claim to normatively determine 
the subject. As such, it too should be subject to the “self-discipline” of critique, 
although such a self-reflection, for Foucault no less than for Hegel and 
Nietzsche, is deeply historical in ways Kant’s Critiques were not.99  
So, let me make a final point to close. The point of this paper is in no 
way an attempt to absurdly ‘collapse’ either Foucault into Kant, or visa versa. 
Pivotal differences remain between the projects of the two authors. In terms of 
their respective re-framings of philosophy as an “attitude” or ethos, which is 
                                                 
93  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A738-9/B766-7. 
94  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A709/B737. 
95  Allen, “Foucault and Enlightenment”, 200. 
96  Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, p. 312 ff. 
97  Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, p 304. 
98  Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, p. 316. 
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the central point of similarity I have tried to emphasise between their works, 
in fact, this very fact that such differences between them remains is of the 
essence. If we were to try to locate the principle of the existing differences 
between Foucault and Kant, though, it would seem to lie exactly in their 
orientation towards the question and the possibility of epistemic and moral 
universality. As the predominant reception of Foucault’s work bears out, 
Foucault’s work reads at times as opposed to any form of universality per se, 
and to indeed see within it- after Nietzsche- the reactive rationale for the 
levelling of individuals and singularity as such.100 Foucault hence differentiates 
his form of ‘critique’ in “What is Enlightenment?” from that of Kant in the 
following terms:  
 
But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has 
to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has 
to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, 
necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, 
contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?101 
 
Kant’s work, by contrast, inaugurates the tradition that runs through 
German Idealism into the work of Marx, and which sees in universality 
precisely that dimension which frees humans as humans from immediate 
immersion in the particularity of sensuous existence. As Marcuse puts this 
type of position in “The Foundations of Historical Materialism”, talking of 
Marx’s notion of the ‘species’- or universality- of a type of being, which 
discursive human understanding can uncover beneath the manifold 
appearances: 
 
The species of a being is that … is the ‘principle’ of its being that is common 
to all the particular features of what it is: the general essence of this being. If 
man can make the species of every being his object, the general essence of 
every being can become objective for him: … It is for this reason … that he 
can relate freely to every being: he is not limited to the particular state of the 
being and his immediate relationship to it, but he can take the being as it is in 
its essence beyond its immediate, particular, actual state …102 
 
We saw above how Kant stakes exactly this type of contention, in examining 
the “Transcendental Deduction” of the first Critique. As Kant’s argument runs, 
without the categories, there could be no possibility of self-consciousness; and 
without this possibility, there could not be any consciousness of objects at all, 
                                                 
100  Cf. for example David Owen, Maturity and Modernity, chapter 10. 
101  Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment”. Accessed 13/12/04. Available at 
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let alone a possibility of critique. Universality is in and after Kant then seen 
not as a cloying equalization but something that- in the distance it allows vis-
à-vis the particular- is an enabling thing: indeed, the condition for the 
possibility of anything like autonomy and individuality. 
 It is surely a sign of the force of the thought of Foucault and Kant that, 
in many ways, the stake of this key philosophical disparity stands at the 
philosophical basis of the most lasting contemporary debates about the 
providence of modernity, and the possibility and desirability of any ‘post-
modern condition’. As for any terminus of these debates, perhaps we can do 
no better to close than to cite Foucault’s famous response when asked about 
his politics, and whether it embodied a kind of pessimism or rationale for 
apathy: 
 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, 
which is not the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always 
have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism. I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make 
every day is to determine which is the main danger.103 
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